



# **Irish Fiscal Advisory Council**

How national budget  
policy works



Eddie Casey, 25 Sep 2022  
Citizen's Assembly on Biodiversity Loss

# The Government's budget

- The Government's budget is not like a household's budget
  - Strong borrowing capacity
  - State can always raise more tax in future
    - But this has limits*
  - People can choose to work elsewhere, firms can opt to relocate
- Government decisions have macro impacts
  - Example: prices can rise more if jobs market is already strong and Government increases spending / cuts tax

# Government debt can become unsustainable

Government debt ratio (% national income)




Source: Barnes, Casey and Jordan-Doak, (2021). *“Managing government debt at high altitude: velocity, instability and headwinds”*.

Note: For different starting debt ratios, the figure shows how debt ratios evolve for an illustrative interest-growth differential of -5% (bottom lines), -2% (middle lines), and 0% (top lines) and a primary balance = 0. \* The shock shows what happens if the interest-growth differential worsens by 2 percentage points.

# Often not a problem until very suddenly


- When the financial crisis hit, countries could no longer borrow at low or sustainable rates
- Choice was 1) default, 2) overnight austerity (cut deficits instantly), or 3) seek emergency support to buy time

Ten-year government bond yields (%)



Sources: DataStream

# Country-specific risks were ignored for a long time before financial crisis



Whelan, K. (2013). Sovereign default and the euro. Oxford Review of Economic Policy Vol. 29, No. 3, SOVEREIGN DEBT: UNDERSTANDING BOND MARKETS DURING THE EUROZONE CRISIS (AUTUMN 2013), pp. 478-501

# Government's have a bias towards running deficits

## Share of time spent in deficit

% years 1960-2014


	<b>Australia</b>	<b>Austria</b>	<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>Germany</b>
% Last surplus	81 2008	83 1974	96 2006	74 2007	77 2012
	<b>Denmark</b>	<b>Spain</b>	<b>Finland</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>UK</b>
% Last surplus	51 2008	79 2007	25 2008	91 1974	85 2001
	<b>Greece</b>	<b>Ireland</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Japan</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
% Last surplus	81 1972	81 2007	100	70 1992	89 2008
	<b>Norway</b>	<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>Portugal</b>	<b>Sweden</b>	<b>USA</b>
% Last surplus	4 2014	48 2008	100	42 2008	92 2000

Source: Economic Outlook, OECD and Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) for older data.

# This leads to a run up in debt

## OECD Countries Debt Ratios

% GDP



Source: IMF Historical Public Debt Database. <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/DEBT>

# Why is there a bias to run deficits?

- Three reasons often cited:
  - “**Short-termism**”: policymakers don’t pay enough attention to the medium and long term.
  - “**Common pool**” problem: some constituencies care more about using common resources for their own local benefit => ignoring overall budget impact.
  - “**Time inconsistency**”: governments might commit to keeping debt sustainable today but will find it difficult to follow through on this tomorrow => will fail to offset big expansions being run now, will find it hard to raise taxes later on, might not raise pension age as planned



# So we have rules

- First wave of fiscal rules:
  - Overly simplistic – 3% GDP deficit; 60% GDP debt
  - No recognition of business cycle (maybe  $>3\%$  deficits are temporarily okay in a recession?)
- Second wave:
  - Overly complex – structural balances, output gaps, spending rule linked to potential output (unobservables)
  - Highly procyclical – allowed spend more in good times, less in bad times
  - Weakly enforced

# So we have rules


- Third wave?:
  - More than likely, the EU will move to a spending rule
  - Why?
    - That's what governments actually have most control over (revenues and hence deficits depend on growth)
    - Less reliance on unobservable things like output gaps
  - How will it work?
    - Idea would be to have some debt target in mind (example, 60% GDP)
    - Then set spending growth *before tax increases / cuts* that you are allowed for next 5-10 years based on expected "sustainable" growth in economy and revenue

# And we have Fiscal Councils

- Have become part of international good practice
- Similar rationale as for independent central banks
- But fewer actual powers (can't set policy; that's up to politicians)
- Instead, they subject the public finances—which are usually obscure—to systematic, rigorous, and highly public scrutiny
- Can help voters elect competent governments & know trade-offs (example: same pension age, but higher PRSI)
- Helps encourage policymakers run more sustainable policy

# Fiscal Councils

## Number of fiscal councils



Source: Debrun and Kinda (2014) - updated to include Spain's AIReF.

# Do Fiscal Council's work?

- Associated with more accurate forecasts (less over-optimism)  
Beetsma et al. (2018)
- Helpful influence on public debate  
Debrun, Gérard and Harris (2017)
- Positive association with budget balances, rules compliance  
Capraru et al, (2020), Lledo (2018), Beetsma et al. (2018),  
Debrun and Kinda (2017),

# The Australians put it more colourfully...



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## Parliamentary Budget Office is keeping the bastards honest

By **DAVID UREN**  
ASSOCIATE EDITOR  
(ECONOMICS)

12:00AM MAY 18, 2016  
 NO COMMENTS



Parliamentary Budget Officer Phil Bowen says of his office: 'It has helped to level the playing field ... [and] to say there has been no impact on transparency would be wrong'. Picture: Ray Strange.

# The Council



Sebastian  
Barnes, chair



Prof Michael  
McMahon



Dawn  
Holland



Alessandro  
Giustiniani



Dr Adele  
Bergin



# **Budgeting today**



# Government's 5% Spending Rule

- Basic idea:
  - Real growth tends to be 3% per year, price inflation 2%
  - If we grow spending that fast, should be sustainable (as revenues will grow at same speed)
  - Temporary or one-off spending is excluded

# This means budget increases of about €4 to 5 billion each year

- But €2 billion usually eaten up by cost of “standing still”
  - Demographic pressures: more retirees, schoolkids
  - Rate increases: Welfare, pensions, public sector pay
- What about taxes? Rule doesn't allow for additional spending if you raise them. It should!



# Lots of other pressures

Ageing costs


Overreliance on corporation tax

Climate Change

Sláintecare


...also housing

Medium and long-term challenges need to be addressed  
% GNI\*, estimated cost range



# Only small areas where taxes might be raised

% total general government revenue in 2021



# Key takeaways

- 1) Budget = complex interaction between budgetary sustainability, fiscal rules, political behaviour, and competing demands
- 2) Ireland faces an ageing population, moderating growth, and big pressures
- 3) There are limited plans to introduce revenue-raising measures

# Questions for you

- What are budgetary costs/benefits of measures needed?
- Can you provide evidence, be transparent on these?
- Are there ways to address biodiversity loss without fiscal costs?
- Are there existing spending programmes/subsidies contributing to the loss that could be repurposed (ask IGEES, ESRI)?

# Thank you


**Eddie Casey**

[www.FiscalCouncil.ie](http://www.FiscalCouncil.ie)



# Ireland is ageing rapidly

## Ages 65+ as % of population aged 15–64




Source: [Fiscal Council Long-term Sustainability Report \(2020\)](#)




# Ageing population

Life expectancy at age 65 is rising




The number of people reaching age 65 is increasing rapidly



Sources: Fiscal Council workings ([Long-term Sustainability Report](#)).

# Debt likely to fall more slowly and then begin to rise sharply after 2040



Sources: CSO; Department of Finance; and Fiscal Council calculations.

<https://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/%20long-term-sustainability-report/>